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1. INTRODUCTION 
Trade issues are rarely discussed in isolation from other policy 
issues. The conference that led to the Havana charter for an In­
ternational Trade Organization (ITO) was the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment. Chapter II of the charter 
assigned to the ITO the task of resolving the most pressing eco­
nomic problems of the late 1940s, including attaining full em­
ployment, eliminating balance·ofpayments disequilibria, action 
against inflationary or deflationary pressures, and promoting fair 
labor standards. Chapter III committed the ITO's members to 
cooperation on economic development and reconstruction, and 
chapters III and V established the ITO as a forum for negotiating 
agreements on technology transfer, foreign investment, double 
taxation, and restrictive business practices, as well as commodity 
agreements (ICITO 1948). 
While the Havana charter was never adopted, its chapter on 
commercial policy survived in the form of the GATT. Linkages 
taken over into the original GATT concerned balance-of-payments 
disequilibria and competition, to which a linkage between trade 
and development was subsequently added. Under the WTO, 
commitments on trade in goods have now been linked with 
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commitments on intellectual property rights through an integrated 
dispute settlement mechanism. 
When the Uruguay Round was brought to a close in April 
1994 at the Marrakesh ministerial, the list of linkages with trade 
proposed by various speakers included environmental policies, in­
ternationally recognized labor standards, competition policy, com­
pany law, foreign investment, immigration policies, development, po­
litical stability, and alleviation of poverty (GATT Document 
MTN, TNC/45 [MIN], 12) . Only one of these proposals was ac­
cepted: the Decision on Trade and Environment provides for the 
WTO to continue the work of the GATT on environment 
(GATT 1994, 469) .  Efforts to link trade with labor standards did 
not succeed at the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore in De­
cember 1996, but two working groups were established to study 
the relationship between trade and investment and the intersec­
tion between trade and competition, respectively. 
As the preceding paragraphs demonstrate, l inkages between 
trade and other policy areas have long been a feature of the multi­
lateral trade order, and recent events suggest an intensification of 
the trend. The pursuit of domestic policy objectives through the 
multilateral trade order raises fundamental issues for the newly 
established WTO. Will such l inkages be beneficial or harmful to 
the young institution? Will the attainment of domestic policy ob­
jectives be furthered or frustrated by their integration into the 
world trade order? Will regimes established in disparate policy 
areas mutually reinforce or weaken each other when interacting 
in a single treaty with an integrated enforcement mechanism? 
This paper attempts to shed light on these questions by exam­
ining the experience of the GATT with the linkages made be­
tween trade and balance-of-payments matters, development poli­
cies, and objectives of antitrust policies. This paper argues that 
the integration of these subject matters into the multilateral trade 
order undermined both the trade order and the attainment of the 
objectives in those nontrade policy areas. At least two important 
lessons can be drawn from this experience: first, the pursuit of 
domestic policy objectives through trade policy instruments is not 
judicable and therefore leads to a de-legalization of international 
trade relations; and second, exemptions from trade policy disci­
plines designed to permit the pursuit of domestic policy objectives 
attract protectionist forces that eventually subject that objective to 
their ends. The application of these lessons to the trade and envi­
ronment linkage is considered in detail.  
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2. THE PURSUIT OF DOMESTIC POLICY OBJECTIVES THROUGH 
THE GATT 
2.1. Trade and lvfonetary Policies 
Within nations, trade policy and monetary policy are con­
ducted in isolation. Trade policies are basically structural policies 
determined by legislators for long periods of time, whiie mone­
tary policies are conducted on a daily basis by central banks, often 
politically independent of the executive and legislat ive branches. 
Trade and monetary policies are generally implemented with dif­
ferent instruments: trade policies with tariffs, quotas, and similar 
measures; monetary policies with interventions in -che exchange 
and money markets . 
The architects of the postwar economic system nevertheless 
considered that it was necessary to link these two policy areas. 
GATT contracting parties were permitted to impose import re­
strictions for the pu rpose of correcting a balance-of-payments 
deficit; in other words, to use trade policy instruments to achieve 
monetary objectives. According to article XII of the GATT, 
which applies to all WTO members, and section B of article 
XVIII, which appl ies only to developing countries (GATT 1994, 
501, 512), a 'X'TO member may impose import restrictions to 
safeg'uard its external financial position provided the restrictions 
do not exceed those necessary to prevent a serious decline, or 
achieve a reasonable increase, in its monetary reserves. The re­
strictions need not be withdrawn even if a change in monetary 
policies would make them unnecessary. 
The 1979 Declaration on Trade 1vleasures Taken for Balance­
of-Payments Purposes of the GATT contracting parties recog­
nized that "trade measu res are in general an inefficient means to 
maintain or restore balance-of-payments equilibrium" (GATT 
1978-79, 205). This statement is regarded by most economists as a 
truism. Since the fundamental cause for a balance-of-payments 
deficit is normally an excess of domestic consumption over do­
mestic production, the solution lies in most cases in restrictive fis­
cal and monetary policies that help reduce the overall level of 
consumption. Imposing import controls on particular products 
will influence the pattera of domestic consumption but cannot 
have any predictable and durable impact on the overall level of 
domestic consumption. Like devaluations) import controls 
. ' . r . . ]1 . 1 ' l 1 r change the pnces or J nternat1ona�1Y tradeo. products� out on.y ror 
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imports <J.nd not exports, and therefore constitute at best "half a 
devaluation" (GATT 1983, 16). 
In practice, the trade measures imposes under articles XII and 
XVII:B of the GATT have not been applied across the board to 
all imports and have thus distorted the price relationships not 
only between imports and exports but between different catego­
ries of imports. Such distortions inevitably entail addition<JJ inef­
ficiencies, widening the gap between domestic production and 
consumption. For these reasons, the only predictable conse­
quence of an import restriction imposed under the GATT's bal­
ance-of-payments provisions is a worsening of the balance-of­
payments deficit. 
What practical use did the GATT contracting parties make of 
the balance-of-payments provision? In the immediate postwar pe­
riod, they were mainly invoked by European countries struggling 
to achieve the convertibility of their currencies . In the 1960s, 
when convertibility had been achieved, many European coun­
tries, eschewing devaluations, used the provision to justify import 
restrictions designed to maintain the exchange value of their cur­
rencies. In 1971, the United States invoked article XII to justify 
an import surcharge imposed to force its trading partners to ac­
cept a revaluation of their currencies in relation to the dollar. 
Since the replacement of the International lvionetary Fund's 
(Hv1F) par value system by a system of flexible exchange rates in 
the early 1970s, industrialized countries ceased almost completely 
to invoke the GA TT's balance-of-payments provisions (Roessler 
1975) . 
These provisions then became the almost exclusive preserve of 
the developing counties, which invoked them, often for decades 
or longer, as a legal justification for their import substitution 
policies . By doing so, developing countries avoided the proce­
dural strictures of GATT article XVII:A and C, which were 
meant to be the legal basis for restrictive import measures im­
posed for development purposes. As import substitution policies 
became less popular and the pressure on the more advanced de­
veloping countries to liberalize grew, they began to disinvoke 
1 "1 h 1 1 f 
. . 
I ' vomntanq t e oa ance-o -payments prov1s10ns. n 1995 and 
1996, seven WTO members ceased to apply article XVII:B or gave 
undertakings to disinvoke it. In early 1997 the Hv'IP found that 
India did not have a balance-of-payments problem justifying an 
invocation of article XVII:B. The only members still consulting 
in the \):?TO Co.mmittee on Balance-of-Payments Restrictions 
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(BOP Committee) are Bangladesh, Hungary, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka, and Tunisia. Of these countries, all except Hungary 
have invoked article XVIII:B since their accession to the GA TT.1 
The determination as to what constitutes a serious decline or a 
reasonable increase in reserves is made by the BOP Committee on 
the basis of a determination by the IMF. According to article 
XV:2 of the GATT, the IMF's views on this matter must be ac­
cepted by the WTO (GATT 1994, 507). Under the current 
monetary system, however, the IMF faces an impossible task. 
The level of import controls necessary to resolve the reserve prob­
lem depends on the level of the exchange rate: the greater the de­
valuation, the less protection will be required to safeguard the ex­
ternal financial position. In the past, the IMF's par value system 
dictated the choice of the exchange rate, namely the exchange rate 
agreed with the IMF, but under the current monetary system, the 
choice of any exchange rate by the IMF would be arbitrary. If it 
chooses the exchange rate that prevails after the introduction of 
the import restrictions, its determination would only reflect what 
the market has already decided and automatically sanction the 
level of import controls actually applied. If it chooses the ex­
change rate that would be required to eliminate the need for the 
restrictions, it would effectively eliminate the right under articles 
XII and XVIII:B to impose restrictions. In short, the criteria that 
determine the level of restrictions have not been capable of ra­
tional application for more than two decades-except for the de­
termination that a country has no balance-of-payments problems 
and therefore the level of restrictions should be zero-but the 
GATT, and now the WTO, have nevertheless not adopted any 
other criteria. 
The linkage between trade and monetary matters has helped 
neither the GATT nor the IMF in the pursuit of their basic objec­
tives. The right of all WTO members to impose import restric­
tions in the event of a balance-of-payments deficit creates signifi­
cant legal uncertainty in international trade relations, and 
nourishes the illusion that import controls can reduce a deficit. It 
is disquieting that the United States could now, consistent with its 
WTO obligations and section 122 of its Trade Act of 197 4, im­
pose a surcharge on a wide range on its imports, or that China 
could, once it becomes a WTO member, withdraw all the market-
1 Information supplied by the WTO Secretariat. 
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access commitments now painfully being negotiated in the process 
of its accession to the WTO simply by writing a letter to the di­
rector general of the WTO. In practice, the use of balance-of­
payments provision by developing countries deprived them of the 
possibility to invoke GATT disciplines to ward off domestic pro­
tectionist pressures. The restrictions originally imposed in a 
payments crisis often created their own pressure groups, making 
their subsequent removal politically difficult or impossible. As a 
result, the countries disinvoking the balance-of-payments provi­
sions generally required long transition periods to phase out the 
restnctlons. 
From the perspective of the monetary order, the balance-of­
payments provisions of the GATT have also not had a favorable 
effect. Article IV:l of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF states 
that "the essential purpose of the international monetary system is 
to provide a framework that facilitates the exchange of goods, 
services, and capital among countries" (IMF 1978, 6). However, 
the GATT balance-of-payments provisions allowed governments 
to postpone devaluations and therefore to mask the most visible 
sign of fiscal or monetary mismanagement. By helping govern­
ments postpone the political consequences of mismanagement, 
these provisions created a permanent moral hazard for govern­
ments, undermining the smooth operation of the international 
monetary system. 
The right of GATT contracting parties to impose IMF­
sanctioned trade controls in payments crises originally served to 
promote the goals of convertibility and of exchange rate stability, 
considered by the architects of the postwar international eco­
nomic order to be of a higher priority than trade liberalization. 
Now the convertibility of the major currencies has been achieved 
and exchange rate stability as such has ceased to be a goal of the 
IMF. Nevertheless the IMF insisted throughout the Uruguay 
Round on the maintenance of GATT's balance-of-payments pro­
visions and even on their extension to the General Agreement of 
Trade in Services (GATS) .2 One explanation is that the balance­
of-payments provisions give the IMF the possibility to approve 
trade measures that permit its members in payments crises to use 
their scarce financial resources to reimburse their debts rather 
2 See the Declaration on the Relationship of the World Trade Organiza­
tion with the International Monetary Fund (GATT 1994, 447), and articles XI 
and XII of the GATS (GATT 1994, 337). 
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than w pay fer additional imports. The previsions sought by the 
IMF thus ?"0ive it the comoetence to aoprove measures designed to .t r .L.. \-' 
protect its own financial interests and those of its members. 
The response to the above observations might be that the link 
between trade and monetary matters is a fact of political life, 
without w·hich the world trade order would not be politically re­
alistic. In reply, it could be pointed out that the world trade or­
der should not pave the way to disaster but react appropriately 
when it occurs. Debt crises are also a political fact o:f life, but the 
creation of a formal legal framework for the rescheduling of debts 
has been wisely avoided. Rather than granting WTO members an 
almost unconditional right to impose trade controls for decades 
merely because of a payments deficit, the WTO should grant ad 
hoc time-bound waivers when grave crises arise, on conditions tai­
lored to the circumstances of the case. The explicit and perma­
nent linkage between trade and monetary matters incorporated in 
1947 into the GATT has neither an economic rationale nor a po­
litical rationale and serves neither the purpose of the worid trade 
order nor that of the international monetary system. 
2.2. Trade and Development Policies 
The central theme of international economic diplomacy in the 
1960s and 1970s was third world development. The Charter on 
the Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the United 
T"hrions in 197 4, made all aspects of international economic coop­
eration subservient to the goal of development (General Assembly 
resolution 3281 [XXIX] of 12 December 1974). In the GATT de­
cision on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reci­
procity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" 
(GATT 1978-79, 203), the principle of nonreciprocity in trade ne­
gotiations between developed and developing countries was rec­
ognized, developed countries were permitted to accord tariff pref­
erences to developing countries under the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP), and developing countries were accorded the 
right to exchange preferences among themselves in the name of 
coilective autonomy. 
Today, the ne�· international economic order is long forgot­
ten, and the charter lies in the wastepaper basket of history, De­
clining tariffs eroded the commercial attraction of the GSP, and it 
never achieved its ethical mission-to create greater em.1alitv .t ' . 1 h b r· d 1' among natlons-oecause L e enents were concentrate on a small 
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group of highly advanced developing countries. The principle of 
nonreciprocity had on balance a negative impact on trade liberali­
zation: rather than inducing developed countries to liberalize uni­
laterally imports in sectors of export interest to the developing 
countries, such as textiles and agriculture, the principle provided 
developing countries with a justification for refusing to make 
market-access commitments and to sign the agreements on non­
tariff measures concluded in the Tokyo Round. As a result of the 
principle of nonreciprocity, developing countries were deprived 
of the main benefit of GATT membership, namely the exposure 
to a system of rules and procedures that help correct the protec­
tionist bias in trade policymaking, and of the benefits of adher­
ence to codes of good government practice incorporated in the 
Tokyo Round agreements (Hudec 1987). The cause of develop­
ment was manifestly not served by releasing developing countries 
from their GATT obligations. 
The trade and development linkage eliminated the rule of law 
in north-south trade relations . The most-favored-nation rule was 
removed, but no other rule of conduct was put in its place . The 
beneficiaries of the principle of differential treatment were never 
defined. The GSP permits the donor countries to unilaterally de­
termine the beneficiaries and to withdraw the preferences at any 
time, which led developed countries to impose numerous condi­
tions on the grant of the preferences. Thus, the main preference 
donors, the United States and the European Community, each 
make GSP benefits conditional on the adoption of certain labor 
standards, cooperation in drug control, and many other policy 
conditions.3 The nonreciprocal nature of the preferences thus 
3 Under Title V of the United States Trade Act of 1974, a developing coun­
try cannot receive preferences if inter alia the country expropriates or otherwise 
seizes control of l?roperty owned by a U.S. citizen, including patents, trade­
marks, and copynghrs; repudiates an agreement with a U.S. citizen; imposes 
taxes or other excations with respect to property of a U.S. citizen; refuses to 
cooperate with the United States to prevent narcotic drugs from entering the 
U mted States unlawfully; aids or abets any individual or group that has com­
mitted an act of international terrorism; denies its workers internationally rec­
o�nized rights, including acceptable minimum wages; refrains from enforcing 
arbitral awards; is a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries. 
Under article 3:2, 7, 8, and 9 of Council Regulation (EC) 3281/94 of 19 De­
cember 1994 (Official JournaJ of the European Communities, 31 December 
1994, no. L 348/1), the European Community makes GSP benefits available to 
countries that conduct a campaign to combat drugs; apply the conventions of 
the International Labor Organization on the freedom or association, on the 
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turned out to be an illusion: rather than reciprocating in the field 
of trade, the developing countries were forced to make conces­
sions in other policy areas without receiving legally guaranteed 
benefits in return. The new law of north-south relations con­
sisted essentially of clauses enabling, but not obiiging, developed 
countries to accord trade advantages under unilaterally deter­
mined conditions . What was hailed by some authors as "a new 
law of development" (Hubbard 1979, 92) consisted essentially of 
rules delegalizing trade relations between developed and develop-
. . 
mg countnes. 
The historical failure of the GATT in this area was the ab­
sence of an appropriate response to the genuine problems that 
low-income states may have had in applying G ATT principles. 
For instance, certain countries with a fiscal infrastructure insuffi­
cient to raise revenue through domestic taxes could have been 
given the right to levy import duties for revenue purp oses. In­
stead, the GATT responded to the broad political demands of the 
Group of 77, a coalition spanning the richest and poorest develop­
ing countries with no common trade interests. This group was 
able to formulate only the demand to exempt all of its member­
ship form the rules of the GATT, and make them all eligible for 
GSP. I\Tone of the instruments the GATT adopted in response to 
the demands of the developing countries was therefore targeted to 
the real and definable problems of these states and to those of the 
poorest among them. 
2.3. Trade and Competition Policies 
At present, the only provision in the WTO agreements that 
links trade with competition is article VI of the GATT, which 
declares that dumping "is to be condemned if it causes or threat­
ens material injury to an established industry" (GA.TT 1994, 493) 
and permits the levying of duties to offset such dumping. 
Dumping and antidumping have been extensively analyzed in 
the literature on imperfect competition. At their origin, anti-
protection of the right to organize and bargain collectively, and on the mini­
D,1�m age for admiss10n to employment; apply sta�dards refating t_o the sustain­able manaoement of forests; do not pract1ce any rorm of forced labor; do not 
manifest shortcomings in customs controls on export or transit of drugs; com­
ply with international conventions on money laundering; do not engage in un­
fair trading practices, such as d�scr�mination agains; ��e European Community, 
comply 'Nlt h market-access obbgat10ns under the '0//.i 0 agreements. 
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dumping prov1s10ns in the international trade agreements wr:re 
intended to protect competition against anticompetitive oractices, 
and in particular to combat predatory pricing (Hindley and 
:tv1esserlin 1996). The general conclusion is that predatory pricing 
is only in exceptional situations a rational strategy of cor�panies 
locked in battle for control of a market and that, in most casesj 
the antidumping provisions have been used in circumstances in 
which predatory pricing cannot occur. Thus, it was found rhat 
"most antidumping cases involve products with a considerable 
number of producers at the global level, none of whom has a 
dominant share of global output" (Hinkley and 1v1esserlin 1996, 
21). As a result, there is no economic rationale for the vast major­
ity of antidumping cases. 
Even on the assumption that predatory pricing may occur and 
will need to be suppressed by governments to safeguard competi­
tion, there would still not be any justification for special rules that 
differentiate between domestic and imported products. Article 
III, the GA TT's national treatment provision, and article XX:d of 
the GA TT's general exceptions allow WTO members to apply 
their competition policies equally to all sources of predatory pric­
ing and to take in respect of imported products all measures nec­
essary to secure compliance with those policies. The only func­
tion of the WTO antidumping provisions is therefore to permit 
WTO members to apply to imported products competition rules 
that are more onerous than those applied domestically. 
Article VI of the GATT is supplemented by the -WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 
(Antidumping Agreement), which regulates the application of an­
tidumping measures at the national level in great detail. Such an 
agreement fosters the illusion that the rule of law applies in this 
area. In fact, however, the agreement leaves WTO members with 
an extrernely wide range of discretion in determining whether in­
jurious dumping has occurred, and its article XVII:6 explicitly ex­
empts the exercise of this discretion from a full review- by WTO 
panels and the 'X!TO Appellate Body (GATT 1994, 193). The ex­
ercise of t
_
he right
_ 
to. tak� ant_idu?Jpin� �eas�res is c?nsequently 
not submitted to JUdicable cntena and e1tect1ve multrlateral con­
r:ol, notwithstanding the plethora of 'N'TO mles on their applica­
tiOn. 
The origin of antidumping provisions in the GATT was in­
nocuous, and such measures were rarely applied in the first two 
decades of the GATT's existence. As other authors have amD1Y -'- ' 
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dumping prov1s10ns in the international trade agreements were 
intended to protect competition against anticompetitive practices, 
and in particular to combat predatory pricing (Hindley and 
Messerlin 1996). The general conclusion is that predatory pricing 
is only in exceptional situations a rational strategy of companies 
locked in battle for control of a market and that, in most cases, 
the antidumping provisions have been used in circumstances in 
which predatory pricing cannot occur. Thus, it was found that 
"most antidumping cases involve products with a considerable 
number of producers at the global level, none of whom has a 
dominant share of global output" (Hinkley and Messerlin 1996, 
2 1). As a result, there is no economic rationale for the vast major­
ity of antidumping cases. 
Even on the assumption that predatory pricing may occur and 
will need to be suppressed by governments to safeguard competi­
tion, there would still not be any justification for special rules that 
differentiate between domestic and imported products . Article 
III, the GA TT's national treatment provision, and article XX:d of 
the GATT's general exceptions allow WTO members to apply 
their competition policies equally to all sources of predatory pric­
ing and to take in respect of imported products all measures nec­
essary to secure compliance with those policies. The only func­
tion of the \VTO antidumping provisions is therefore to permit 
WTO members to apply to imported products competition rules 
that are more onerous than those applied domestically. 
Article VI of the GATT is supplemented by the WTO 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 
(Antidumping Agreement), which regulates the application of an­
tidumping measures at the national level in great detail . Such an 
agreement fosters the illusion that the rule of law applies in this 
area. In fact, however, the agreement leaves WTO members with 
an extremely wide range of discretion in determining whether in­
jurious dumping has occurred, and its article XVII:6 explicitly ex­
empts the exercise of this discretion from a full review by WTO 
panels and the \X'TO Appellate Body (GATT 1994, 193) . The ex­
ercise of the right to take antidumping measures is consequently 
not submitted to judicable criteria and effective multilateral con­
trol, notwithstanding the plethora of WTO rules on their applica­
twn. 
The origin of antidumping provisions in the GATT was in­
nocuous, and such measures were rarely applied in the first two 
decades of the GA TT's existence. As other authors have amply 
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docur: .. '1ented, however) the provisions became a safe harbor for 
projectionist domestic interests (Hindley and Messerlin 1 996) .  
Once GATT contracting parties were permitted to deviate from 
the basic trade policy principles, ostensibly to pursue competition 
policy objectives, the political forces that these principles are to 
control overwhelmed the competition policy objectives . There is 
nearly unanimity in the academic world now that the WTO's 
rules on antidumping operate to protect competitors rather than 
competition and consequently have acquired a rational that is the 
complete opposite of the one they were originally meant to serve. 
3 .  THE TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT LINK: WILL HISTORY 
REPEAT ITSELF? 
The t rade and environment debate raises issues and submits 
the principles of the world trade order to  scrutiny from a new 
perspective. However, there are elements in the proposals to  in­
tegrate environmental concerns into the multilateral trade order 
that so strongly resemble aspects of the unsuccessful linkages 
made between trade and other policy matters that a repetition of 
past mistakes is to be feared. 
Technically, there is no conflict between environmental poli -­
cies and trade policies . The rules of the 'X'TO do not prescribe or  
prevent the  attainment of any domestic policy goal i n  the  field of  
the  environment . They are merely " negative" rules prohibiting 
policies that distinguish, openly or in disguise, between products 
and services or service suppliers as to their origin or destination. 
Such distinctions are, however, normally not necessary to  attain 
domestic environmental policy goals (Roessler 1996b) .  'X/hy then 
do so many environmental organizations consider WTO law as a 
threat to domestic environmental legislation? 
Their opposition is based on the fear that many laws further­
ing environmental and other public interests may only be adopted 
with elements that are contrary to WTO law. The legal con­
straints imposed by WTO membership create in their view obsta­
cles to the formation of domestic political coalitions between sec­
torai interests pursuing protecti;nist aims and publ ic-interest 
groups pursuing environmental goals, and the rulings of the 
'�ITO panels put into jeopardy existing domestic laws furthering 
legitimate domestic policy objectives for which there is, politi­
cally, no prospect of a �<'TO-consistent solution. As Ralph 
Nader stated in his testimony before the U.S .  Senate Finance 
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Committee on the results of the Uruguay Round (16 March 1994, 
photocopy): "Raw log export bans are one of the most trade re­
strictive means to attain the goal of conserving our nation's for­
ests. Yet,  after years of debate, raw log bans were the only politi­
cally feasible approach because they accommodated the interest of 
providing alternative lumber processing jobs to those who would 
no longer be cutting down forests . Laws with such mixed eco­
nomic and social purposes, of which there are many, would likely 
fall before challenge under the World Trade Organization's 
rules. "  
Ralph Nader is no  doubt right. And many other illustrations 
can be provided to substantiate his point. Take the case ,  for in­
stance, of the introduction of a new clean-air standard for gaso­
line. Such a standard, by itself, can of course be introduced for all 
gasoline without any legal constraints under WTO law. A prob­
lem of WTO consistency would arise, however, if the domestic 
political constraints are such that a new standard would secure a 
parliamentary majority only if domestic gasoline is exempted 
from the standard for five years or, to put the issue in political­
economy terms, if the cost of reducing pollution is initially borne 
only by nonvoting producers abroad. That discrimination would 
be inconsistent with the GATT's national treatment provisions of 
article III and would most likely not be justifiable under the 
GATT's public policy exceptions of article XX. The five-year ex­
emption violating the GATT 1994 would thus not be technically 
necessary to implement a higher environmental standard (it would 
in fact reduce the new standard's environmental impact during 
the transition period) , but would be politically necessary to adopt 
the higher standard. 
Another example illustrating Nader's point is the phase-out 
mechanism for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) included in the 1987 
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
In theory, the phase-out of CFCs could have been achieved 
through internal measures consistent with the national treatment 
principle, for instance, a system of sales licenses. However, such a 
system would have imposed only burdens on the producers of the 
chemicals and would probably not have won their support. The 
mechanism that was instead adopted provides for quantitative 
limits on the production of CFCs in the members, combined 
with a ban on imports from nonmembers, with the result that the 
consumption of CFCs is reduced. Under this mechanism, the de­
cline in the domestic supply of CFCs combined with the import 
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controls generated rents for the domestic producers during the 
phase-out period, and the scheme therefore won their support . 
The import controls were thus not technically required to protect 
the ozone layer, but were politically necessary to win the support 
of the producers of ozone-depleting chemicals (Enders and Porges 
1992) .  
How can the dilemma of groups pursuing environmental goals 
be accommodated in the WTO law? One approach would be to 
add a provision to the GATT 1994 permitting discriminatory 
trade measures if a legitimate domestic policy goal would not be 
politically attainable without that measure. However ,  such a 
"political necessity" clause would establish a license for unprinci­
pled policymaking, and the market-access rights under the WTO 
agreements would therefore be submitted to the vagaries of the 
domestic political process of the WTO members .  A provision 
with these functions, however drafted, would not mark a line be­
tween international trade interests and domestic policy con­
straints, and would therefore be incompatible with the rule of law 
in international trade relations (Roessler 1996a) .  
Environmental groups have also been concerned that a WTO 
member is, under the principle of unconditional most-favored­
nation treatment, unable to offset through trade measures the 
economic consequences of the differences between its environ­
mental policies and those of other WTO members .  This concern 
is reflected in the following statement by Ralph Nader ( 16  March 
1994) : 
U.S.  corporations long ago learned how to pit states 
against each other in a "race to the bottom" -to provide 
the most permissive corporate charters, lower wages, pol­
lution standards, and taxes. Often it is the federal gov­
ernment's role to require states to meet higher federal 
standards . . . .  There is no overarching "lift up" jurisdic­
tion on the world stage . . . . The Uruguay Round is crafted 
to enable corporations to play this game at the global level, 
to pit country against country in a race to see who can set 
the lowest wage levels, the lowest environmental stan­
dards, the lowest consumer safety standards . Notice this 
downward bias-nations do not violate the GATT rules 
by pursuing too weak consumer, labor . . .  and environ­
mental standards. . . . Any . . . demand that corporations 
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pay their fair share of taxes, provide a decent standard of 
living to their employees or limit their pollution of the air, 
d 1 I . 1, b . h h f . "Y ' water an Land w1 1 . e met w1t t e re ram, ou can t 
burden us like that . If you do, we won't be able to com­
oete . ·we'll have to close down and move to a country 
�hat offers us a more hospitable business climate ."  
The theoretical l iterature on interjurisdictional competition 
indicates that the problem described by Ralph Nader is largely a 
reflection of a desirable competition among jurisdictions and not 
a race to the bottom ('X!ilson 1996) . Given that jurisdictions can 
be assumed to choose environmental quality to maximize the wel­
fare of residents, they have no incentive to offer firms exemptions 
from taxes required to cover costs to the environment even when 
competing for scarce capital . However, second-best situations­
unavailability of policy instruments or distortions in market 
structure or both-may give rise to the adoption of inefficiently 
low or too high standards; again, a case-by-case analysis is neces­
sary. 
Furthermore, if the race-to-the-bottom argument is accepted, 
it would apply not only to environmental policies but to all poli­
cies that affect the location of industries, including tax and sub­
sidy policies, the provision of infrastructure, and production regu­
lation of all kinds . Eliminating a race to the bottom only in the 
area of environmental policies would merely displace the race into 
other policy areas, for example in workers' safety. At the end of 
this process , there would no longer be local jurisdictions within 
federal states, and states would have to cede their policy auton­
omy to international authorities (Revesz 1992) . 
\Xlhat would be the consequence of a new general rule in  the 
'Y/TO legal system that would perm!t WTO members to apply 
import taxes and restrictions designed to offset the competitive 
advantages that differences in environmental and other regula­
tions accord to producers abroad/ With such a rule, the law of 
4 There is no provision in the WTO agreement that p ermits trade restric­
tions specificallv designed to offset differences in domestic policies. \'VTO 
members may {mpose countervail ing duties on products that b enefit from a 
domestic production subsidy. However, a countervailing duty may be imposed 
even if the importing contracting party also accords a subsidy. Two WTO 
members granting the same fiscal advantages to their steel industries may im­
pose (and frequently impose in practice) countervailing duties on the steel 
products exported to each other. The countervail ing-duty provisions of the 
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the WTO would provide legal security only for the products and 
services traded between pairs of countries with identical domestic 
production regulations . This would be contrary to the principle 
of comparative advantage according to which nations are to ex-
1 • t . d'C_C h '  l ,.. f1 d . h . J p101t tne1r 1nerences, w .. 1cn are ott e n  re lecte m t . 1e1r  regu.a-
tions (Bhagwati 1 996) . IV1oreover, rhe unconditional most­
favored-nation principle would be lost , and with it the peace­
engendering impact of that principle. With a general rule that 
permits WTO members to eliminate the external effects of the 
differences between them, the \XTTO legal system could therefore 
no longer fulfill its functions. 
One legal method to take into account the domestic p oiitical 
constraints of 'JVTO members and the fear of a race-to-the-bottom 
effect of trade liberalization would be to permit them to individu­
ally vary their market-access commitments in accordance with 
those constraints. That method is already available. The market­
access commitments under the \\'TO agreements are made by 
product (GATT), by sector (GATS) , or by entity (Agreement on 
Government Procurement) . The schedules of commitments of 
\X/TO members therefore vary significantly. Moreover, WTO 
members are entitled to renegotiate their commitments. Both 
during the process of negotiating the commitments and after their 
acceptance, WTO members thus have the possibility to adjust 
their trade obligations in accordance with their domestic political 
constraints and the external impact of their policies. However, 
this adjustment takes place at the time when market-opening 
commitments are negotiated or after a renegotiation based o n  
reciprocity, and therefore maintains the balance o f  rights and ob­
ligat ions among members . 
From the perspective of 'w'TO law, the issue is thus not 
whether domestic policy constraints should be taken i nto account 
or whether trade liberalization entails a healthy competition 
WTO are therefore not provisions permitting measures designed to offset pol­
icy divergences, but are provisions permitting the rrotection of import­
competing industries contingent upon the protection o_  an exporting industry 
i-? ano�her country. This observation can also be made in respect of th� provi­
SJon or the GATT that exempts measures related to the eroducts of pnson la­
bor from the obligations under the GATT (article XX:e) .  It i s  true that the 
domestic policies of another WTO member trigger in this case the right to im­
pose imoort controls, but that right may be exercised independently of the 
orison-labor regulations of the contract ing party imposing the import control. 
�'\ WTO member could consequently permit the safe of products produced in 
domestic prisons while restricting the sale of those made in foreign prisons. 
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among jurisdictions or a destructive race to the bottom. Given 
the right of each member to adjust its market-access commitments 
w its perception of these issues, the real issue is whether WTO 
members should be able to react to the external repercussions of 
their own domestic policy choices by unilaterally withdrawing 
their market-access commitments or whether they should be able 
to do so only by renegotiating their commitments. A multilateral 
trade order based on the rule of law cannot but be based on the 
principle of renegotiation. 
There are many proposals to use the market-access opportuni­
ties created by the obligations assumed under the WTO agree­
ments as bargaining chips to induce other countries to change 
their environmental policies, and the withdrawal of these oppor­
tunities as sanctions against countries that do not cooperate in the 
protection of the environment. Thus, Steve Charnovitz (1993, 
282) wrote: 
How can an agreement on m1mmum standards be 
achieved among a hundred countries with different values 
and resources? One approach is to devise a clever mix of 
carrots and sticks from a diverse enough issue garden to al­
low a cross-fertilization of concerns. The goal is not only 
to obtain an agreement, but also to maintain its stability. 
The carrots are the basic tool. Because countries face dif­
ferent economic trade-offs . . . an assistance mechanism can 
be developed to enable gainers to compensate losers and 
rich nations to "bribe" poor ones . This assistance could be 
in the form of financial aid or technology transfer . . .  , or 
it could be trade concessions. 
The proposal to use the world trade order as a source of car­
rots and sticks for the pursuit of environmental objectives is based 
on three illusions. The first is generated by the image of "carrots 
and sticks." "Carrot" suggests that you give something of value to 
you; "stick" suggests that you inflict pain without hurting your­
self. However, such sticks do not exist in international economic 
relations . Here, nations can hurt others only by hurting them­
selves at the same time; a trade sanction inflicts costs both on the 
imposing nation and on the target nation, and the cost for the 
former can sometimes exceed that of the latter. The choice is thus 
not, as the image suggests, between costly subsidies and costless 
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trade sanctions, but between subsidies that transfer resources from 
one nation to another and trade sanctions that destroy the re­
sources of both (GATT 1 99 1) .  
If the image o f  carrots and sticks has such currency i n  the 
trade and environment debate, it is probably because the costs of 
trade sanctions are generally so thinly spread across populations 
that they arouse little political opposition and are therefore not 
taken into account in the public debate. This is probably also the 
reason that a trade sanction seems to be the only stick seriously 
considered in the trade and environment literature even though 
the arsenal of economic sanctions contains many more sticks, 
such as the interruption of financial relations, telecommunica­
tions, transport services, and so forth. These other types of eco­
nomic sanctions may be just as effective in obtaining commit­
ments from other nations to cooperate in the protection of the 
environment as trade sanctions; however, they will cause concen­
trated and easily visible effects for a small group of producers and 
will therefore engender greater political opposition. If one has 
concluded that sanctions are required to achieve a negotiating 
goal, one still needs to decide that among the sanctions available 
the trade sanction is the most efficient one. The public choice on 
that issue, however, is likely to be distorted by the bias that dis­
torts the public choice on trade policies generally. The focus of 
the trade and environment debate on trade sanctions, rather than 
economic sanctions generally, is an indirect reflection of this bias. 
The second illusion is that the goals of trade liberalization and 
environmental protection can be obtained simultaneously in a 
single negotiation. In a reciprocity-based negotiation in the 
WTO, a nation will not obtain in return for its market-access 
commitment an equivalent market-access commitment and com­
mitments in another policy area; it will obtain only one or the 
other and will therefore have to decide which of the two objec­
tives to pursue. To propose that a multilateral negotiation cover 
market access issues and a raising of environmental standards is 
therefore to propose that nations with high environmental stan­
dards pursue their trade interests or their environmental interests. 
The third illusion is that the trade and environment link is a 
one-way street toward better environmental protection .  In any 
system in which the results of reciprocity negotiations are en­
forced through a right to retaliation, an issue linkage becomes a 
two-way street: if market access and the protection of endangered 
species were to be successfully linked in WTO negotiations, trade 
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concessions could be withdrawn in response to the failure to pro­
tect an endangered species and vice versa. If environmentalists 
k . 1 W"'"'O h " d' )) L l 
. 
1 see m the 1 t e tra � e weapon to IUrt 1er env1ror1menta 
• 1 h [ . 1 1 • 1 • 1 goals, tney must t ere1ore accept that otner natwns o ot am t 1e 
"environmental weapon" to defend their trade interests . I-low­
ever, it is totally inappropriate to make commitments on such es­
sential matters as the protection of endangered species, where the 
withdrawal from obl igations may have irreversible effects ,  de­
pendent on the ups and downs of commercial po lic ies . The main 
purpose of international bargaining is  to create regimes, systems 
of rules and procedures making governmental actions more pre­
dictable. Each of these regimes cannot furnish predictability if it  
is constantly exposed to the need to adjust to a b reakdown i n  
other regimes . That is  true for both t h e  international trade order 
and international environmental law. 
The inherent limitations of the cross-retaliation principle were 
recognized by the negotiators of the WTO agreements . Initially, 
the United States, mainly with its interest in protecting world­
wide intellectual property rights in mind, proposed that there be 
an unbridled right of cross-retaliation under the WTO dispute set­
tlement procedures. However, it subsequently revised its position 
to the effect that retal iation across sectors should be resorted to 
only if retaliation within the sector was not practical o r  effective. 
This change reflected the fear of the United States '  banking sector  
that cross-retaliation resulting from failures to observe obligations 
in the field of trade in goods might upset the delicate balances of 
interest between nations i n  the field of financial services. Article 
22: 3  of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) therefore 
now contains eight subparagraphs which, while maintaining the 
principle of cross-retaliation, define meticulously the circum­
stances under which a WTO member mav retaliate across sectors 
and the elements of the Uruguay Rounci' package that constitute 
individual sectors, segregating-of course-financial services as a 
separate sector (GATT 1994, 423) . If environmental groups did 
not have the illusion of the one-way street, they would, just like 
the U.S.  banking community, make every effort to ensure that 
their important cause is not throw into the crab basket of trade 
1 "  1 . po�1cymaKmg.  
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4 .  CONCLUSION 
\V'hat do the l inkages between trade and domestic policy ob­
jectives reviewed in this paper have in common? In each case,  the 
linkage led t o  the creation of new rules permitting governments 
d r ' . . . l f h ld 1 1 • 1 to epart rom bas1c pnnc1p es o t e wor · t race oraer Wlthout , 
however, establishing effective new disciplines constraining the 
exercise of the resulting discretion. The reason was that the new 
rules enabled governments to pursue monetary, development, and 
competition policies with second-best policy instruments, and) as 
economic theory has amply demonstrated, one cannot define in 
the abstract ad in advance under what circumstances the choice of 
the wrong instrument for the right policy raises welfare . Only a 
case-by-case analysis is appropriate in this situation. No generally 
applicable, abstract rule is therefore conceivable that would dis­
tingtlish between permissible and forbidden second-best policies 
on economic efficiency grounds. 
The choice of the second-best policy instrument was permit­
ted essentially for political reasons, that is, to exempt from GATT 
disciplines the trade policy measures of governments politically 
unable to pursue their monetary, development, or competition 
policies with more direct and efficient policy instruments. How­
ever, a GATT rule that defines the domestic political circum­
stances that would justify the resort to a second-best policy in­
strument is impossible to craft. For instance, in the case of 
balance-of-payments policies implemented through trade measure, 
such a rule would have to provide for something like the follow­
ing: "A WTO member incurring a serious balance-of-payments 
deficit may, instead of devaluing its currency, impose an import 
surcharge if it demonstrates that its government would, if it were 
to devalue, lose the next election/be toppled by riots/ encounter 
serious problems in containing wage demands ."  It is obvious that 
such a rule would not be seriously considered even though it 
would precisely reflect the political purpose of the GA TT's bal­
ance-of-payments exception. A fundamental lesson that can be 
drawn from the GATT's links with monetary, development , and 
competition policies is that, upon entering the realm of the sec­
ond-best, the realm of the rule of law is left, and any such link 
therefore entails a delegalization of international trade relations. 
Each of the linkages reviewed above was made to harness the 
instruments of trade policy for domestic policy objectives. In all 
three cases, however, the protectionist forces freed by the elimina-
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tion of the trade policy disciplines seized the occasion and over­
whelmed the domestic policy objective . Thus, the antidumping 
provisions, originally designed to protect competition, now oper­
ate exclusively to protect competitors . Another conclusion that 
can therefore be drawn from the exoerience under the GATT is 
that , if domestic policy objectives 
�
are not pursued in a trade­
neutral manner, they attract protectionist interests that will tend 
to undermine the attainment of these objectives. As a result nei­
ther the world trade order nor the causes such linkages were 
meant to serve benefited from the link. 
Many of the proposals to pursue environmental objectives 
through the multi-lateral trade order have features that resembie 
those of past failed linkages between trade policy instruments and 
domestic policy objectives. Again proposals are made that would 
permit the use of trade measures in the pursuit of policy objec­
tives that cannot be attained efficiently with trade policy instru­
ments. And, again, the hoped-for cross-fert ilization is likely to 
turn into cross-contamination. The fundamental i llusion that 
prompts these proposals is that the link between environmental 
policies and trade policies is a one-way street and that it is there­
fore possible to use the political pressures behind trade policy in­
struments for one's policy objectives without in turn being sub­
jected to these pressures . In fact, however, that l inkage, as the 
previous linkages of its kind, is likely to turn into a disservice to 
the important cause it is meant to advance . 
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